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Introduction 
 Kurt Vonnegut was liberated from the German prison in Dresden in 1945. His war 
novel portraying the events he witnessed, namely the firebombing of Dresden, was not 
published until 1969. Why did it take him so long to write this novel? What happened in 
the intervening years to direct the themes of the novel?  
 This paper seeks to answer these questions in an attempt to shed more light on the 
famous American author and the era following World War II. To understand the 
environment in which Slaughterhouse Five was developed, I will first explore the 
political climate following WWII. I will consider the use of analogies such as the Munich 
analogy in policymaking, both in private discussions between policymakers and in public 
forums where analogies were used to persuade the public. The Munich Syndrome was a 
political assumption that all aggression in the world should be treated like the aggression 
of Nazi Germany leading up to WWII. This assumption informed many of the foreign 
policy decisions following the war. The Munich Syndrome also assumed that US 
involvement in WWII was undeniably noble and that the Allied powers were solely a 
force for good. Slaughterhouse Five tells a more human story, one that focuses on the 
parts of WWII that no one wanted to discuss.  
 Slaughterhouse Five was a product of many factors in Vonnegut’s life. First, I 
will explain how Vonnegut’s experiences of war as a child, soldier and prisoner gave him 
a different perspective on war. Then, I will show how his experiences after the war 
greatly influenced the tenor of the novel. And finally, I will examine the themes of the 
novel and how they undermine the assumptions of the Munich Syndrome. 
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 I chose to write about Vonnegut and the creation of Slaughterhouse Five because 
I believe this popular, anti-war book is so much more powerful when placed in its 
historical context. Vonnegut wrote an anti-WWII book at a time when American leaders 
were actually using WWII analogies to inform their foreign policy decisions. And 
Vonnegut’s message about the struggle of veterans upon returning home has a much 
greater effect when his audience understands that Vonnegut himself endured that journey. 
The war took away twenty-four years of his life. Twenty-four years during which he 
struggled to cope with his experiences.  
 
Section I: Political Environment 
 1969 was the peak of US involvement in Vietnam: 543,000 American troops were 
stationed in the remote Southeast Asian country (Collier). Slaughterhouse Five, published 
in 1969, stands in direct opposition to the reasoning that led post-WWII policy makers to 
increase US involvement around the world, culminating with the war in Vietnam. Policy 
makers used lessons that they drew from WWII to justify intervention abroad; 
Slaughterhouse Five undermines these lessons and ultimately weakens the justifications 
for US involvement in Vietnam. To fully understand the development of Slaughterhouse 
Five it is necessary to examine the historical context in which it was developed and the 
decision-making process that Vonnegut undermines.  
 
US Involvement After WWII 
 After WWII the United States became increasingly involved around the world. In 
Great Britain’s weakened state after the war, the formerly powerful empire could no 
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longer protect its interests abroad. Britain’s waning influence worldwide combined with 
the growing threat of the Soviet Union and Communism spurred the US to take on more 
international responsibility. This process began in 1946 when the US confronted the 
U.S.S.R. after the Soviets refused to remove troops from Iran after WWII ended. Then in 
1947 the United States decided to support right-wing governments in Greece and Turkey 
against communist rebels. 1948 was the first year that the United States’ escalations 
abroad involved committing US troops to foreign soil, in this case, in order to break the 
blockade that the Soviet Union had set up around Berlin. The Korean War lasted from 
1950 to 1953. American troops were stationed in Lebanon in 1958. The United States met 
with success in some of these situations and kept defeat at bay in others, like the Korean 
War. Policymakers were emboldened by the successes and ultimately led the US into the 
Vietnam War, which began in 1964 and lasted until 1973 (Collier). 
 The escalation of US involvement in these years and the transition to military 
action has been attributed to the lessons that policy makers took from WWII.1 Peter 
Beinart calls it the “Hubris of Toughness,” but the most common term for this 
relationship is the Munich Syndrome (Beinart). In Prisoners of the Past? The Munich 
Syndrome and Makers of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era, Göran Rystad 
explains the Munich Syndrome as comprised of three components: the Munich analogy, 
the Domino Principle, and the Aggression Theory (Rystad 25).  
 Policymakers have used the Munich analogy as proof that appeasement will 
inevitably lead to general war. International aggressions starting with the Japanese 
                                                        
1
 See Goran Rystad Prisoners of the Past?, Peter Beinart The Icarus Syndrome, 
and Yuen Foong Khong Analogies at War. 
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invasion of Manchuria in 1931 were met with minimal response from global players who 
were still war weary from WWI. Benito Mussolini’s Italy took Ethiopia in 1935. In 1936 
Adolf Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland, a direct violation of the Treaty of Versailles. 
Hitler then occupied Austria and set his sights on Czechoslovakia. This move finally got 
the attention of some of the major powers. France had a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with 
Czechoslovakia and French ties with the British also brought Great Britain into the 
picture (Khong 174-75).  
 The Munich Conference took place on September 30, 1938 between French 
Premier Edouard Daladier, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, Hitler, and 
Mussolini. The document signed at the conference agreed to the German annexation of 
the Sudeten part of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain returned to England claiming that he 
had established peace. However, just six months later Hitler took the rest of 
Czechoslovakia and began making demands of Poland, ultimately leading the way to 
WWII (Khong 174-75). 
 After the war ended, American leaders were significantly impacted by the lessons 
of the Munich Conference: no aggression could go unchecked. Cordell Hull, Secretary of 
State from 1933 to 1944, adhered to this philosophy, claiming, “What happened in the 
thirties in China, Ethiopia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland – all far removed from 
us geographically – was a cumulative series of steps that led unerringly to our 
involvement in the Second World War” (qtd. in Rystad 31). Similarly, in regard to 
communism, Republican Senator from 1928 to 1935, Arthur H. Vandenburg stated, 
“there is something of a ‘parallel’ in remembering what occurred prior to a similar 
cleavage between democracy and nazism, when we surely learned that we cannot escape 
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trouble by trying to run away from it and when ‘appeasement’ proved to be a fatal 
investment” (qtd. in Rystad 31). 
 A popular theme taken from the Munich Conference is known as the Aggression 
Theory. The Aggression Theory declares that totalitarian states are inherently aggressive 
and that aggressors will not stop their offensive actions without a countering force. 
Chamberlain and Daladier hoped that giving Hitler the Sudetenland would stop his 
aggressive behavior, but Munich Syndrome adherents believe this only spurred Hitler’s 
aggression and encouraged him to take over even more territory. As President Lyndon 
Johnson said when discussing the Tonkin Gulf Affair, during the Vietnam War, “We 
have learned that aggression unchecked is aggression unleashed” (qtd. in Rystad 49). 
This type of logic demonstrates why American leaders felt it was necessary to intervene 
in remote areas of the globe where communists demonstrated aggressive behavior. In 
each case US policymakers determined that any aggression was a direct threat to the 
United States because aggressors would not stop until they were compelled to. 
 The Domino Theory is the final component of the Munich Syndrome. The 
Domino Theory states that if one geographic region falls to communism, the surrounding 
areas will soon fall too. This was first used in the Near East Crisis. Dean Acheson, 
Secretary of State during the Truman Administration, used the Domino Theory to 
persuade Congress to assist Turkey and Greece: “Iran borders on Afghanistan and 
India… carries us to Burma, Indonesia, and Malaya, areas in French Indochina… and that 
carries you to China. And what we are trying to point out is that a failure in these key 
countries would echo through vast territory” (qtd. in Rystad 30). This kind of reasoning 
makes most countries of the world “key countries” and therefore makes most of the world 
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vital to US national security. The Domino Theory greatly expanded American concerns 
abroad.  
 These analogies were deeply imbedded in American political life; Vonnegut 
would have to work against them in order to show a darker side of WWII, a side where 
Allied actions could be called into question. These quotations from various influential 
American leaders show that they used the lessons of Munich to persuade the American 
people that intervention abroad was vital to US interests. However, some in-depth studies 
have shown that the use of analogies in policymaking actually has a significant impact on 
the kind of policy that is produced. Analogies serve a dual function of (1) getting the 
American public on board with significant policy changes, and (2) actually impacting the 
development of these policies. In the following sections I will explain and synthesize the 
literature on the affect of analogies on decision-making, then I will examine uses of 
analogies in public by looking at Harry Truman’s speeches regarding Turkey and Greece 
and Korea. 
 
The Effects of Analogies on Policymaking 
 The similarities drawn between WWII and confrontations in other areas of the 
world is important because they have had a real impact on the makers of foreign policy. 
Rystad determines that the three components of the Munich Syndrome were “expressions 
of the basic assumptions dominating and determining the psychological world of most 
American decision makers in the Cold War Era” (Rystad 71). However in Analogies at 
War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, Yuen Foong 
Khong takes this a step further and makes the substantial and compelling argument that 
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the components of the Munich Syndrome were not just the expression of assumptions but 
that they actually significantly affected the decisions made by policymakers. Whereas 
Rystad emphasizes how policy makers used analogies to justify and persuade, Khong 
argues that the psychological effects of analogies are enough to have influenced the 
policies during the Cold War. 
 Analogies help people interpret situations and produce solutions in six steps, 
according to Khong (Khong 21). The first three steps allow for interpretation. First, an 
analogy helps the analogy-maker to define the situation. Second, it provides the analogy-
maker with a sense of what is at stake in the situation. Third, the analogy can suggest 
possible solutions to the problem. The final three steps allow the analogy-maker to 
evaluate the proposed solutions. Fourth, the analogy-maker can predict the likelihood of 
success using the analogy for guidance. Fifth, the analogy can help to evaluate the moral 
rightness of the proposed solutions. Finally, sixth, the analogy can provide a warning for 
the dangers associated with the solutions.  
 Khong’s hypothesis is supported by psychological research that shows that 
schema and analogies are significant components of cognitive processes. Schema is more 
general than an analogy: “schema is a generic concept stored in memory” (Khong 26). 
Associating aggression with general war is a schema; it is a general belief or feeling that 
is associated with a certain concept. Comparing specific events such as the aggression of 
North Korea in 1950 to the aggression of Germany in 1938 is an analogy. Both are 
important types of knowledge structures that shape how a person perceives other stimuli. 
Khong determines that if it is true that these knowledge structures are crucial parts of 
information processing, “it follows that the analytical view’s assumption that analogies 
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play an important information processing role in foreign policy decision-making is 
strongly vindicated” (Khong 28). Importantly, Khong also points out that schemas allow 
policy makers to fill in the blanks of information with the “default values” from the 
schema. Therefore, if policy makers ascribe to the Korea analogy when interpreting the 
situation in Vietnam, they may remember that North Korea was supported by the Soviet 
Union and China. If North Vietnam is displaying the same sort of characteristics that 
North Korea displayed than it follows, using schema, that North Vietnam is also 
supported by the Soviet Union and China. Then policy makers can determine that the 
successful maneuvers used in Korea can also be successful in Vietnam. 
 Schemas and analogies affect the way that people process information, making 
them biased towards certain reasoning: “They make possible and control the 
characterization of incoming data, the positing of causal relationships among variables, 
and the prediction of outcomes” (Khong 220). The cognitive functions of schemas and 
analogies provide an explanation for why some policies were accepted while others were 
rejected. To explain this process, Khong notes a psychological study conducted by 
Harold Kelley in which participants were split into groups and each group was given a 
seven-adjective description of a lecturer. Some groups received positive adjectives while 
other groups received negative adjectives. The study showed that those groups that 
received a positive description thought that the lecturer was warm and friendly. In 
contrast, the groups with the negative descriptions thought that the same lecturer was cold 
and self-centered. The conclusion was that “simple manipulation of expectations had a 
profound influence on the perception of the subjects” (Khong 38). An important point of 
this study was that information that did not fit the schema given to the participants was 
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ignored. In this way it is possible to understand how policy makers could assume 
information about Vietnam that was not founded in evidence but that fit with their 
schema. Vonnegut also shows the effects of schema on Americans in his novel. Pieces of 
the story that do not fit in with the noble image of WWII are largely ignored, like the 
broken veteran Billy Pilgrim and the Allied bombing of Dresden.  
 
Use of Analogies in Policy Debates 
 The frequent use of analogies in private discussions among American leaders 
lends credibility to the hypothesis that analogies serve a greater purpose than just 
persuading the public. Khong’s research shows that analogies used in connection with 
Vietnam between 1950 and 1966 were almost just as frequently invoked in private as 
they were in public. In public, parallels were drawn between Vietnam and Korea, 
Vietnam and the 1930s, and Vietnam and Greece a total of 137 times (Khong 60. Table 
3.1). The most common analogies used in private were Korea, the French experience in 
Vietnam, and Malaya, and these analogies were used a total of eighty-four times (Khong 
61. Table 3.2). If analogies were only prevalent in public addresses then it might indicate 
they are used only to persuade or justify policy changes to the American people. The 
presence of analogies in private debates shows that policy makers used analogies to 
convince one another; therefore they must have believed in the lessons that the analogies 
produced. 
 The total number of the most frequent analogies used in public broken down by 
quarter between 1961 and 1966 shows that every major decision regarding Vietnam was 
accompanied by a spike in the use of analogies in private (Khong 98. Figure 5.1). Four 
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peaks can be discerned from the statistics. A spike in 1961 corresponds with President 
John F. Kennedy’s decision to send advisors and aid to South Vietnam. The 1964 spike 
corresponds to President Lyndon B. Johnson’s decision to begin an air war in Vietnam, 
and another spike in 1965 relates to Johnson’s decision to begin a ground war. The final 
spike in the data shows the 1966 decision to bomb key spots in North Vietnam (Khong 
98). 
 A transcript of a meeting with Johnson and other key policy makers demonstrates 
that analogies were used frequently and seriously when debating strategy in Vietnam. On 
July 21 and 22, Johnson held a meeting with many key leaders including Under Secretary 
of State George Ball, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and US ambassador to South Vietnam 
Henry Cabot Lodge, among other. The meeting was called to discuss McNamara’s 
recommendation that the United States commit a substantial number of troops to 
Vietnam, thus committing the United States to a large land war in Southeast Asia.  In 
order to substantiate their claims, many of the policymakers used their chosen analogies 
to convince others at the meeting. George Ball urged caution and recommended 
withdrawing from Vietnam because he ascribed to the French experience analogy. Ball 
saw many similarities between the French involvement in Vietnam and the American 
involvement in Vietnam; therefore he did not believe that the US could reach any 
favorable outcome. In contrast, Johnson and McNamara invoked Korea to determine that 
the US could and should act significantly in Vietnam. On the second day, Johnson met 
with his military advisors. Paul Nitze, the secretary of the Navy, pointed to the 
McArdle 13 
Philippines and Greece as evidence that guerilla forces can lose and so the guerilla forces 
in Vietnam could be beaten with the addition of more force (Khong 123-33).  
 Each analogy invoked at the two meeting was met with opposition and facts that 
were meant to disprove similarities that connected the situation in Vietnam to the French 
experience, Korea, and Greece and the Philippines. Only one analogy was met with no 
opposition. Henry Cabot Lodge told his colleagues, “I feel there is a greater threat to start 
World War III if we don’t go in. Can’t we see the similarity to our own indolence at 
Munich?” (qtd. in Khong 129). No one disagreed. Khong points out that the silence was 
due to the power of the analogy; everyone thought it was correct:  
In their public speeches, their memoirs, or their writings, the Vietnam 
policymakers often made the point that Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of 
Hitler at Munich helped start World War II; for that reason, the United States 
could not allow Ho Chi Minh to take over South Vietnam, lest that lead to another 
world war. (Khong 134)  
This also explains why the 1930s, Munich, analogy was used more frequently in public 
than in private, as discussed above. The 1930s analogy was not used in private as much 
because none of the policy makers needed to be convinced of its relevance. The Munich 
analogy was taken for granted: of course, aggression needed to be stopped or it would 
expand over the entire globe.  
 
Escalation Justified by the Munich Syndrome: Public Use 
 In examining the political environment that Slaughterhouse-Five was developed 
in, it is important to look at the public use of analogies because public explanations and 
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addresses are what Vonnegut would have been aware of. Analogies were used privately 
to develop policies, but they were also used publicly to convince Americans that major 
policy changes were necessary to ensure American national security. 
 US intervention following WWII started off slowly but gradually snowballed into 
massive, long-term intervention in Vietnam. The beginning of US intervention abroad 
was in 1946 with the Near East Crisis, involving Iran, Greece, and Turkey. This crisis 
marks the moment in history when “the lessons of the thirties were applied to new 
realities, to the emerging post-war confrontation between the United States and the Soviet 
Union” (Rystad 25). 
 Great Britain struggled financially after the war. The once great empire had 
always kept Russian advances in check, but its ability to do so was quickly fading 
(Beinart 115). The Soviet Union stationed troops in Iran during the war and refused to 
withdraw them once the war was over until the USSR got a share of Persian oil. Although 
the Soviet Union was demanding oil, US policy makers inferred a more devious agenda. 
American diplomat Loy Henderson told the State Department that the Soviet Union was 
poised to invade Turkey straight through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean and 
invade Iran through the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean (Rystad 26). Fear of an 
aggressive move by the Soviets propelled President Harry Truman into aggressive action. 
He demanded that the Soviet Union withdraw its forces and he sent $10 million in 
military aid to Tehran (Beinart 115). These bold moves worked and the Soviets were 
gone within a year. 
 Britain’s exhaustion both spiritually and financially caused power vacuums in 
other areas of the globe as well. In 1947 a British embassy official informed the US State 
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Department that Great Britain would no longer protect Greece or Turkey. Turkey was 
being pressured by the Soviet Union; Moscow was demanding bases near the 
Dardanelles, which would greatly increase its power in the eastern Mediterranean and the 
Middle East (Beinart 115). In Greece, communist rebels were undermining the right-wing 
government.  
 These areas were traditionally under the influence of Great Britain, so American 
officials would be engaging in a major policy change if they agreed to take on 
responsibility for these geographic areas. Such a large extension of US foreign 
engagement would require a persuasive argument to get the American people on board. 
In 1947, Truman created parallels between World War II and the situations in Greece and 
Turkey to convince the American people of the necessity of getting involved; this is one 
of the first instances where the Munich Syndrome is evident.   
 Truman explained the situations in Greece and Turkey in a way that invoked 
World War II. His speech to Congress on March 12, 1947, which has become known as 
the “Truman Doctrine,” spells out his justifications for aiding the two far away countries 
(Truman “Truman Doctrine”). 
 Although Truman never mentions the Munich Conference of 1938, he does 
directly reference WWII and he invokes the Aggression and Domino Theories throughout 
his address. Within the first few moments of the speech, Truman reminds his audience of 
the destruction of WWII by describing the damage done to Greece by the Germans. Later 
on, he tells his audience that the primary objective of WWII is also the primary objective 
in Greece and Turkey; the battle has not been won yet: “One of the primary objectives of 
the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other 
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nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental 
issue in the war with Germany and Japan” (Truman “Truman Doctrine). Truman’s final 
mention of WWII comes at the end of the address when he directly asks for monetary 
assistance for Turkey and Greece. The assistance needed by these two countries was 
minuscule in comparison with the investment of $341,000,000,000 put towards defeating 
the Axis Powers (Truman “Truman Doctrine”). Through using this comparison, Truman 
is asking Congress to see this small intervention as just a further extension of a project 
that has already been deemed worthy by the American people: keeping countries free 
from aggressors.  
 Although Munich is not directly referenced in the Truman Doctrine, the other two 
elements of the Munich Syndrome are present. The Aggression Theory makes its 
appearance first. Truman describes the situation in Greece by painting the rebels as 
“several thousand armed men, led by Communists,” and he accuses them of engaging in 
“terrorist activities” (Truman “Truman Doctrine”). The Truman Doctrine makes it clear 
that the United States is dedicated to stopping all aggression, with no geographic limits 
on this commitment: “We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing 
to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against 
aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes” (Truman 
“Truman Doctrine). In that statement lies the foundation for future interventions. It is 
clear that Truman is expanding US responsibility to protect any nation that appears to be 
the victim of an aggressive nation, any aggressive nation. So when North Korea invaded 
South Korea in 1950, Truman could not dismiss the aggressive move; he had already 
committed to help free peoples throughout the world maintain their free institutions. 
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 The Domino Theory makes an equally strong appearance in this address. The 
right-wing Greek government was being threatened by rebel forces led by Communists. 
In comparison, Turkey seemed to have a weak case. Truman explained that Turkey 
required US assistance in pursuing a program of modernization that would be “necessary 
for the maintenance of its national integrity” (Truman “Truman Doctrine”). To make the 
issue more pressing, Truman followed up the description with this bold statement: “That 
integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East” (Truman “Truman 
Doctrine”). Now the situation is not just about Americans funding a far-away country’s 
infrastructure improvements; now it is about the balance of global power. A few 
paragraphs later, Truman explained exactly what he meant by that statement. If Greece 
fell under the control of the Communist rebels, it would have grave effects on its 
neighbor, Turkey. However, the effects did not stop with bordering neighbors because as 
Truman explained, “It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and 
integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation” (Truman 
“Truman Doctrine). Chaos would spread from Greece to Turkey and then throughout the 
entire Middle East. This in turn would have “a profound effect upon those countries in 
Europe” and ultimately the “Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would 
be disastrous not only for them but for the world” (Truman “Truman Doctrine”). 
 Interestingly, it is also possible to see the effects of schema on the Truman 
Administration in this address. At one point he admitted that the Greek government has 
not always been correct in its actions. However, this should not be an argument against 
supporting Greece because even a bad democratic government is better than a communist 
one. Truman clearly associated a democratic government with positive values and 
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therefore could easily dismiss the shortcomings of the right-wing government. This 
demonstrates the point made earlier in this paper that schemas provide people with a way 
to interpret information and they also explain how contrary evidence can be dismissed.  
 On June 25, 1950 Truman learned that Communist North Korea had invaded 
South Korea (Beinart 119). To understand this act Truman once again looked to the past:  
I had time to think aboard the plane. In my generation, this was not the first 
occasion when the strong had attacked the weak…. I remembered how each time 
that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going 
ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the 
Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. (Rystad 35) 
 The Aggression Theory component of the Munich Syndrome is evident in his statement, 
Hitler could not be stopped by appeasement and North Korea would not stop either. The 
Munich analogy was at the forefront of Truman’s mind: “My thoughts kept coming back 
to the 1930s – to Manchuria – Ethiopia – the Rhineland – Austria – and finally Munich. If 
the Republic of Korea was allowed to go under, some other country would be next, and 
then another just like in the 1930s” (Rystad 35). The powerful Domino Theory was not 
lost on Truman here either; if South Korea fell to communism other countries would soon 
follow. 
 Although the Truman Administration had stated that the containment strategy did 
not extend to mainland Asia, American troops were deployed to South Korea. Truman 
did not want to be accused of appeasement, and recent successes in Iran, Greece, and 
Turkey gave him confidence to extend US involvement to the Asian mainland. Within a 
few days of the invasion, Truman committed US air and naval support to South Korea. 
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 About ten months after the United States became involved in Korea, Truman gave 
an address to the American people to discuss the situation in Korea. The April 10th 
address was much bolder than the speech Truman gave to Congress on Greece and 
Turkey. In the speech Truman used the words aggression and aggressor a total of fifteen 
times (Truman “Report to the American People on Korea”). He also spoke directly of a 
third world war six times. All three elements of the Munich Syndrome are present and are 
more prevalent than they were in the Truman Doctrine. 
 The Aggression Theory is evident throughout the entire speech. Truman described 
North Korea as an “aggressor,” and all of North Korea’s actions are “aggressive.” 
Truman stated, “If history has taught us anything, it is that aggression anywhere in the 
world is a threat to peace everywhere in the world” (Truman “Report to the American 
People on Korea”). If Khong is correct in his explanation of the effects of analogies on 
cognitive processes, then by comparing the situation in South Korea to Munich in 1938 
Truman saw much higher stakes than there might have been in reality. At stake was peace 
everywhere in the world because Truman believed that peace everywhere was at risk 
during WWII. If Truman did not use the analogy of the 1930s, he may have only seen the 
aggression of North Korea as an issue pertaining to just Asia.  
 The Munich analogy is the undeniable foundation of Truman’s argument. He 
explained to his audience: if peace-loving nations “had followed the right policies in the 
1930’s – if the free countries had acted together to crush the aggression of the dictators, 
and if they had acted in the beginning when the aggression was small – there probably 
would have been no World War II” (Truman “Report to the American People on Korea”). 
As discussed previously, when making decisions about Vietnam, Johnson’s advisors 
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often took the Munich analogy as given; no one challenged the assumption that if the 
members of the Munich Conference had confronted Hitler, then no war would have 
occurred. Here, it is clear that Truman had been emboldened to use the Munich analogy 
in such a way. The Munich analogy was not challenged in the Truman Doctrine, and 
successes in Greece, Turkey, and Iran confirmed its truth. Then in 1951, Truman used the 
analogy again, with even greater conviction. The myth of the Munich analogy grew at 
each of these historical moments until its power became so great that it could be invoked 
in a room of intelligent men holding the fate of a nation and not a single one would 
question its legitimacy.  
  The potential solutions put forth by Truman were entirely informed by the 
Munich analogy. He offered that the United States would negotiate, “but we will not 
engage in appeasement” (Truman “Report to the American People on Korea”). He then 
laid out steps for a negotiation; the third and most important step was an end to 
aggression. These steps are where Truman and his successors indicated their belief that 
the members of the Munich Conference went wrong; Daladier and Chamberlain did not 
do enough to ensure that the aggression would end, thus they paved the way for Hitler to 
continue his war.  
 The Domino Theory is employed in this address to exaggerate the importance of 
South Korea to American national security. Truman informed his audience: “The attack 
on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering all of Asia” (Truman “Report to the 
American People on Korea”). The belief was that the Communists were going to unify all 
of Asia under a red flag in order to “crush the United States” (Truman “Report to the 
American People on Korea”). 
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 The April 11 address lays the foundation for intervention in Vietnam by 
strengthening and adding to the same assumptions that the Truman Doctrine set forth. 
The aggression of North Korea could only be stopped with force. A small Asian country 
was vital to US national security because if the small country fell to communism, its 
neighbors would inevitably join. Both of these assumptions are supported by the Munich 
analogy, which went unquestioned in public, and, for the most part, in private too.  
  
Conclusion 
 The connections drawn between WWII and later interventions abroad provided 
credibility to the later interventions. WWII was America’s noble war and, because of this, 
no one would argue with interventions that were judged to be equivalent in importance to 
WWII. By invoking the Munich Conference, policy makers raised the stakes in every 
other instance of aggression. Looking at the outcome of the Munich Conference, people 
could only reasonably come to the conclusion that not standing up to aggression would 
result in another world war.  
 Vonnegut’s war novel, or more accurately his anti-war novel, chops away at the 
connections that policymakers used to justify their interventions; he undermines the 
assumptions of the Munich Syndrome. The focus on the firebombing of Dresden 
highlights the destructive power of war and the injustice that it causes. This is furthered 
by the fact that even though Dresden was an enemy city the destruction was not any less 
cruel and the civilian casualties were not any less tragic. If WWII was not a noble war 
then were the later interventions around the globe really justifiable?  
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Section II: Internal Factors  
 In the previous section, I discussed the political culture centered on the Munich 
Syndrome that caused the growing presence of the United States world-wide following 
WWII. In the following sections I will describe the connections between this discussion 
and Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse Five (1969). As previously mentioned, Vonnegut 
was a prisoner of war in Dresden, Germany when the Allies firebombed Dresden. After 
Vonnegut was liberated and the war ended it took him twenty-four years to publish his 
war novel. I will show why Vonnegut became an anti-war author by discussing how his 
experiences with war at various stages of his life made him feel a repugnance toward it 
and how his post-war experiences shaped his perception of the war, ultimately 
determining how he wrote his war novel. Finally I will demonstrate how Slaughterhouse 
Five works to undermine the assumptions of the Munich Syndrome by discussing the 
pertinent themes of the novel.  
 
Vonnegut’s Experiences with War 
Vonnegut was forged into an anti-war author by his experiences with war in 
various roles. His first experience with the effects of war began at birth; he was born to 
German American parents in the post-WWI environment of anti-German sentiment. 
Then, in 1943, while WWII was continuing to escalate in Europe, Vonnegut left Cornell 
University to enlist in the United States Army; in 1944 he was shipped to Europe. Shortly 
after, he was captured by German forces and sent to work in a prison camp. While a 
prisoner, Vonnegut witnessed one of the most destructive events of WWII, the 
firebombing of Dresden, and its aftermath. As a child, a soldier, and a prisoner Vonnegut 
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experienced several aspects of war and found that the only common theme was 
destruction and suffering. 
  Born in 1922, Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. came into the world during a period of distrust 
and anger directed at Germans. WWI had pitted Americans against Germans and caused 
discrimination and prejudice against German Americans from their fellow citizens. Kurt 
came from a family of well-known German ethnicity. Kurt’s father, Kurt Vonnegut Sr., 
was a second-generation German American and, after graduating from finishing school in 
Philadelphia, Kurt’s mother Edith Sophia Lieber spent time at her grandfather’s castle in 
Dusseldorf (Shields 10). The Vonneguts and the Liebers both belonged to a social 
community of very wealthy German American families. The community centered on Das 
Deutsche Haus, the German cultural center in Indianapolis.  
 Although his parents spoke German and socialized with other German-
Americans, Kurt Jr. admitted that he never learned much about the culture. He blamed 
this ignorance on his parents and the anti-German sentiments that arose from WWI. He 
said that his parents “volunteered to make me ignorant and rootless as proof of their 
patriotism” (qtd. in Shields 25). Kurt Sr. found a note in the family’s mailbox one 
morning that threatened him if he did not stop teaching his children German. The 
Vonneguts were not the only German family that felt pressured to downplay their 
heritage: the Das Deutsche Haus was renamed the Athenaeum after a vandal threw 
yellow paint on it (Shields 25).  
 Culture is a casualty of war in Kurt Jr.’s experience. Even though he was not born 
until after the war, his upbringing was greatly affected by the prejudice that WWI caused 
against Germans. In his mind it was senseless; the Vonneguts were no threat to the 
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United States; in fact, eight Vonnegut men registered for the draft (Shields 25). 
Vonnegut’s biographer, Charles J. Shields notes that Vonnegut’s family was more than 
likely not intimidated by the bigots and nativists that sought to threaten German-
Americans. Kurt Sr. and Edith’s choice to not teach Kurt Jr. German was probably not a 
consequence of the threats because they had not been teaching their older children 
German either. However, Vonnegut’s statements and seemingly bitter attitude towards 
his involuntary cultural ignorance demonstrates that in his mind WWI severed the 
connection between him and his heritage. 
 During the start of WWII, Kurt was enrolled at Cornell University. He was there 
from 1940 to January 1943 when he dropped out to enlist in the army (Shields 48). In 
1944 Vonnegut was shipped to Europe and his division was sent to western Germany.  
Vonnegut’s division came under heavy assault on December 16, 1944, which ended in 
the surrender and capture of the 106th division (Shields 57). During the battle, one of 
Vonnegut’s comrades was shot and left behind. The abandonment of the soldier by the 
rest of the division led Vonnegut to the realization that they were not heroes; they were 
just young men scared and doing everything they could to stay alive. Later on he recalled 
what it was like being a scout: “our whole purpose was to either step on mines or to draw 
fire. Nobody knows what’s out there and we’re so fucking smart we’re going to find out” 
(qtd. in Shields 59). He clearly resented the role and felt used by the Army. The lack of 
concern for his safety, or for the safety of his fellow infantrymen like the one they left 
behind, haunted Vonnegut after the war.  
 The most disturbing parts of Vonnegut’s biography are the descriptions of the 
prison camp and the lives of the prisoners of war. They were starved, forced to march 
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endlessly in the bitter cold, stuffed into boxcars without enough room to move, and that 
was all before they even got to the prison. Upon reaching the prison, an Australian 
prisoner who was part of the Royal Air Force Bomber Command watched the 
Americans’ entrance. He recalled what the Americans endured: “stepping over the bodies 
of comrades who slumped to die in the snow, jolted for days in cattle-trucks and boxcars 
that were strafed and bombed by the Allied air-fighters, the Americans are macabre 
burlesques of men” (qtd. in Shields 61). Filing into the prison, the men were “so shocked 
by their experiences that many are little more than animals stumbling erect” (qtd. in 
Shields 61). Vonnegut and some of his fellow prisoners were not there long, however; 
they were moved to Dresden to work in a vitamin factory. 
 Fellow soldiers in the prison camp served as models for many of Vonnegut’s 
characters in Slaughterhouse Five. One of the most resounding themes of the novel is that 
soldiers were not big, brave heroes but instead they were either at the end of childhood, 
scared and unprepared, or old and overburdened by the deprivation that came with being 
in war. Fellow prisoner Michael Palaia, was the inspiration for the character Edgar Derby 
who was executed for stealing a teapot in the ruins of Dresden. Palaia actually stole a jar 
of pickled string beans because as an older man he was less capable of withstanding the 
deprivation (Shields 75). He was executed the next day; Vonnegut helped dig his grave.  
 A private named Edward “Joe” Crone was the inspiration for the protagonist of 
Slaughterhouse Five, Billy Pilgrim. Crone was not cut out to be a soldier. He wanted to 
be an Episcopalian minister. He had a “childlike face framed by big ears” and was always 
swapping his precious rations for cigarettes (Shields 66). Convinced that he would not be 
allowed to starve, Crone continued to trade away his food until he eventually succumbed 
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to the “thousand yard stare,” which is when “the person sits down on the floor with his 
back to the wall, will not talk, will not eat, and just stares into the space in front of him” 
(Shields 77). Crone was buried in a white paper suit, described by Shields as “a kind of 
holy fool” (Shields 77).  
 On February 13, 1945 the air raid sirens sounded in Dresden. As a cultural center, 
somewhat separated from the war, Dresden was never thought to be in any danger; the 
citizens walked home barely hurried by the sirens (Shields 69). At 10:05 PM the first 
attack began; RAF crews dropped 1,400 tons of high-explosive bombs and 1,180 tons of 
incendiary bombs on Dresden (Shields 70).  A second wave of bombers came three hours 
later. The number of people killed that night is a highly debated topic. Dresden had been 
inundated with refugees from the eastern front, so the range is said to be from 25,000 to 
135,000 dead (“Firebombing of Dresden”). If the number does extend all the way to 
135,000 victims, then the firebombing of Dresden was the single most destructive event 
of WWII, including the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
 It was the job of the American prisoners to try to clean up after the attack. 
Vonnegut was put in the group that was tasked with removing bodies from basement 
shelters where all of the oxygen was sucked out by the fiery tornados caused by the 
bombs dropped above. Vonnegut remembered that the basements “looked like a streetcar 
full of people who’d simultaneously had heart failure. Just people sitting there in their 
chairs, all dead” (qtd. in Shields 74). Down in the tombs the prisoners “fought off 
hysteria when limbs of corpses snapped off or yanking a gas mask hose pulled off a 
head” (Shields 75). Later on, Vonnegut would not describe such gruesome scenes in 
Slaughterhouse Five, but he had the smell of mustard gas and roses follow the 
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protagonist throughout his whole life; it was the smell of the bodies he excavated from 
the Dresden basements. Perhaps he never describes these scenes because they are too 
painful to remember. Compared to the soldier who remembered limbs and heads falling 
off of corpses, Vonnegut’s anecdote about corpses looking like they died of heart failure 
in a streetcar is much more mild.  
 His experiences as a POW had a profound effect on Vonnegut and greatly 
influenced all of his writing after the war until the end of his life. A quote from 
Vonnegut’s nephew Scott precedes the Shields’ biography And So It Goes (2012). Scott 
tells about his uncle’s laughter: “laughter that at times seemed inappropriate following 
the retelling of some of the most ghastly events of the twentieth century. This laughter 
was a mental bulwark against the madness of the war he witnessed.” The horrors of war 
haunted Vonnegut throughout his life. In order to cope with them, he used his laughter 
and sarcasm to push away the memories of the shocking experiences. 
 On May 29, 1945, from a Red Cross Club in the Le Havre POW Repatriation 
Camp, Vonnegut was finally able to write to his family. The letter alludes to themes that 
would become the pillars of Slaughterhouse Five: the senseless destruction of war, the 
nonsensical and inevitable characteristics of death, and the misuse of soldiers by the 
government. He tells his family about the bombing of Dresden, calling it “possibly the 
world’s most beautiful city” (Vonnegut, Letters 8). He tells them about the treatment they 
received as prisoners of war and the death of his comrades. He recalled how upon finally 
reaching the prison, nearly starved to death and frozen, they were put into scalding 
delousing showers, “Many men died from shock in the showers after ten days of 
starvation, thirst and exposure. But I didn’t” (Vonnegut, Letters 7). He told them how 
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Dresden was destroyed and much of the population along with it, “But not me” 
(Vonnegut, Letters 8). The refrain “but not me” or “but I didn’t” in regard to death arises 
several times in the letter. It is echoed by the famous repeating line in Slaughterhouse 
Five: “so it goes.” Vonnegut accepts the randomness of death in this phrase: men died in 
the delousing showers, in the bombings of Dresden, in the bombings by the Russians on 
the Saxony-Czechoslovakian border. Vonnegut recognizes that he could have easily been 
one of those men.  
 Vonnegut’s famous sarcasm also shines through in his letter home. He tells his 
family that he will be sent back to the US soon and “once home I’ll be given twenty-one 
days recuperation at Atterbury, about $600 back pay and – get this – sixty (60) days 
furlough!” (Vonnegut, Letters 9). After everything that he experienced, he is getting sixty 
days furlough as compensation. This issue is resurrected in Slaughterhouse Five when 
Billy Pilgrim is put in a hospital room with Bertram Copeland Rumfoord, a history 
professor who is working on a history of the US Army Air Corps in WWII. Despite 
writing about the bombing of Dresden, Rumfoord actively scorned and ignored the 
veteran lying in the next bed. While Rumfoord exalted the actions of the men who 
dropped bombs on the city, he insulted the man who actually endured the assault and 
witnessed the destruction firsthand (Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse Five 184, SH). The 
encounter demonstrates the way Vonnegut believes people who champion war feel about 
the men who actually fight the war. The men who call the shots care about the numbers, 
not the actual physical, emotional, and mental toll that is paid by soldiers and veterans.  
 As a child Vonnegut learned that wars could cause prejudice and hate even 
between countrymen. At the age of twenty-one he learned that he was not a hero in war; 
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none of his fellow soldiers were: they just wanted to live. As a prisoner of war he learned 
that humans are capable of savagery towards their fellows, and that the savagery was not 
limited to the “enemy.” Vonnegut saw that even his own side was capable of unspeakable 
horrors as he pulled the bodies of women, children, and elderly out of basements where 
they huddled together and prayed for safety. Vonnegut saw from all different angles that 
there was nothing good or glamorous or heroic about war and so the seeds of 
Slaughterhouse Five were planted. 
 
Vonnegut’s Post-War Experiences 
Slaughterhouse Five was published almost two and a half decades after the events 
described in the novel took place. Vonnegut struggled with his war book because he was 
so deeply affected by what he had witnessed that it was too painful for him to write about 
these memories. Four important post-WWII experiences helped Vonnegut to come to 
terms with his experiences and shaped the book that he would write. 
After WWII, Vonnegut continued to pursue his passion, writing. Witnessing the 
destruction of Dresden gave him what every author dreams of: original and compelling 
material to write about. The problem was that nothing came to him. In the first chapter of 
Slaughterhouse Five the narrator, a fictionalized version of Vonnegut, describes the issue 
of writing about Dresden: “When I got home from the Second World War twenty-three 
years ago, I thought it would be easy for me to write about the destruction of Dresden, 
since all I would have to do would be to report what I had seen” (SH 2). However, it was 
not as easy as he anticipated: “I think of how useless the Dresden part of my memory has 
been, and yet how tempting Dresden has been to write about…” (SH 2).  
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Between the end of WWII and the publication of Slaughterhouse Five, Vonnegut 
wrote to friends about the frustration he felt over his war book. On November 30, 1954 
he wrote to his editor Harry Brague: “Look, old friend, as a psychological device, let’s 
pretend there isn’t ever going to be another book written by me” (Letters 60). Sounding 
exhausted at the end of the letter, Vonnegut confessed, “Honest to God – I don’t think 
there’s ever going to be another book, I can’t imagine where the time is going, and I get 
sick if I think about it too much” (Letters 60). A few months later Vonnegut wrote to his 
good friend Knox Burger: “Jesus – wouldn’t it be nice to write just one play a year, or 
just one anything? I’ve pretty well pooped out as a hack. The old Moxie is gone” (Letters 
60-61). Over and over, Vonnegut expresses frustration with writing his Dresden book.  
Some literary critics have explored the idea that writing Slaughterhouse Five 
actually served as a therapeutic process for Vonnegut to work through post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) with which he was afflicted after witnessing the destruction of 
Dresden and undergoing life as a prisoner of war. Both Alberto Caciedo and Susanne 
Vees-Gulani diagnose Vonnegut with PTSD by first diagnosing Billy Pilgrim, then the 
narrator, and tying the work back to Vonnegut the man. Billy Pilgrim, Vonnegut’s 
creation, expresses many symptoms of PTSD as listed by the Department of Veterans 
Affairs, including reliving the traumatic event; avoiding situations that remind the 
afflicted of the event; hyperarousal; feelings of hopelessness; depression or anxiety; and 
physical symptoms (“What is PTSD?”). The narrator, a fictionalized Vonnegut, similarly 
exhibits some of these symptoms including trouble sleeping, drinking problems, and 
relationship problems. The narrator tells the audience: “I have this disease late at night 
sometimes, involving alcohol and the telephone. I get drunk, and I drive my wife away 
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with a breath like mustard gas and roses” (SH 4). In this small confession the narrator 
exhibits four symptoms of PTSD: he drinks too much, he has trouble sleeping, he cannot 
connect with his wife, and he is living in two moments of time by noticing the smell of 
mustard gas and roses which is a smell that reminds him of the dead bodies in Dresden. 
According to Vees-Gulani, Vonnegut’s inability to write about Dresden is 
“evidence of the long-term consequences of his witnessing those events” (Vees-Gulani 
175). Vees-Gulani also makes the argument that Vonnegut wrote a story about someone 
else because writing his own story was too difficult. As discussed in the previous section, 
Billy Pilgrim is based on a man who was a prisoner of war with Vonnegut, Edward “Joe” 
Crone. Billy is pieced together from Crone and Vonnegut because a story based on Crone 
would have ended in Germany where Crone starved to death. However, Billy’s story does 
not end there. Instead he lives on to witness the same events that Vonnegut witnessed. 
Vees-Gulani believes that the mixture of autobiography and fiction “simultaneously binds 
Vonnegut to and distances him from the text and its implications” (Vees-Gulani 180). 
Writing Slaughterhouse Five took Vonnegut so long because it had to be the right book, 
with the right character and the right plot in order for Vonnegut to be able to face his 
trauma without being overwhelmed by it. It took four significant experiences to give 
Vonnegut the perspective he needed to face his memories and create Slaughterhouse 
Five. 
Possibly the most significant impact on Slaughterhouse Five came from Mary 
O’Hare, the wife of Vonnegut’s war buddy Bernard O’Hare, who was also a prisoner of 
war in Dresden. In 1965, Vonnegut went to visit Bernard hoping that together they could 
recollect old war stories that would help Vonnegut write his book. Vonnegut noticed that 
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Bernard’s wife was only barely masking her hostility towards him. The first chapter of 
Slaughterhouse Five recounts the run-in: “Then she turned to me, let me see how angry 
she was, and that the anger was for me. She had been talking to herself, so what she said 
was a fragment of a much larger conversation. “You were just babies then!” she said” 
(SH 14). She accused the narrator of writing a book that will glamorize war when in 
reality he and her husband were just children at the time: “You’ll pretend you were men 
instead of babies, and you’ll be played in the movies by Frank Sinatra and John Wayne or 
some of those other glamorous, war-loving, dirty old men” (SH 14). This event is also 
described in the Shields’ biography; Shields uses the excerpt from Slaughterhouse Five to 
described part of the encounter so the conversation with Mary O’Hare that occurred with 
the narrator in Slaughterhouse Five also occurred with Vonnegut the author.  
Mary’s accusations made Vonnegut think. He agreed with her that they were 
barely at the end of childhood when they were sent to war. Then he had his epiphany: “It 
was war that made her so angry. She didn’t want her babies or anybody else’s babies 
killed in wars. And she thought wars were partly encouraged by books and movies” (SH 
15). So he promised Mary that if the book were ever actually finished he would include 
the phrase “The Children’s Crusade” in the title, which is indeed the subtitle of 
Slaughterhouse Five. That conversation gave Vonnegut the lens he needed to tell his 
Dresden story. Writing a story about the children’s crusade meant that Slaughterhouse 
Five would be a blatantly anti-war book, critical of the horrors of WWII, and focused on 
the human cost.  
Writing about the children’s crusade also offered Vonnegut a lens that put 
distance between himself and the events he would write about. The book would be for 
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Mary and mothers everywhere who wanted to protect their children from the horrors of 
war. This allowed Vonnegut to review the traumatic events he experienced from a 
different angle, perhaps one that was less destructive psychologically. Two decades after 
Slaughterhouse Five was published, Vonnegut wrote to fellow author Jerome Klinkowitz 
who had written an analysis of the book. Vonnegut told Klinkowitz, “I have to admit, 
after reading about all I managed to put into Slaughterhouse-5, that I really was flying by 
the seat of my pants and was lucky as hell. The biggest break, I think, was Mary O’Hare” 
(Letters 338). 
Mary gave Vonnegut his lens and a run-in with a Hollywood agent reinforced the 
idea. In 1966, Vonnegut was still working on his war book. He went to California to visit 
friends and while he was there he met with Evarts Ziegler, a well-respected Hollywood 
agent. Ziegler offered Vonnegut a piece of advice on writing for movies: “create a strong 
central character that a famous actor will demand to play” (Letters 125). Vonnegut gave 
this a try when he got back home. He wrote a part for Kirk Douglas, which directly 
conflicted with what he promised Mary. However the character seemed out of place: 
Vonnegut explained, “I crossed him out again, because the war I saw wasn’t really that 
way” (Letters 125). He could not write an anti-war book titled “The Children’s Crusade” 
and also create a role for a hero. Through this experience Vonnegut realized that he 
would have to stick to the truth. Not only does Slaughterhouse Five have no place for a 
hero, but the spotlight is reserved for an anti-hero; no famous actors would be clamoring 
to play the role of Billy Pilgrim. After this attempt to create a hero and the discovery that 
it would be the wrong story, Vonnegut ceased to complain about writer’s block. The 
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collection of his letters shows many complaints leading up to this event, but none after. 
He had his protagonist and he was ready to write his war book.    
In 1967, still two years away from finishing Slaughterhouse Five, Vonnegut took 
a trip to Europe with Bernard O’Hare. The trip would take them through East Berlin, 
Dresden, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Warsaw, and Leningrad. The trip back to Dresden, 
where he had witnessed and experienced so much destruction and devastation, impacted 
Vonnegut’s work significantly. He went back to resurrect old memories only to find that 
nothing was as he remembered it. O’Hare and Vonnegut found a friendly, English-
speaking taxi driver who would take them to the slaughterhouse where they took shelter 
from the bombs that fell twenty-two years earlier. However, as they drove to the spot 
where it had stood, the veterans saw nothing but open space filled with grass and weeds. 
The whole city was different; the spires and rooftops that had once decorated the skyline 
were gone. After his trip, Vonnegut wrote to his editor, Sam Lawrence, and confessed the 
disappointment he felt: “I will tell you about Berlin and Dresden and Vienna and 
Salzburg and Hamburg and Helsinki and Leningrad, if you really want to hear about 
them. But you would be out of your head to ask” (Letters 138).  He told Sam, “Dresden, 
‘The Florence of the Elbe,’ is now more like Cedar Rapids in 1936” (Letters 138). When 
Vonnegut was liberated in 1945, he wrote home to his family and told them that Dresden 
was “possibly the world’s most beautiful city,” but almost two decades after its 
destruction the once beautiful cultural center looked more like a small town in Iowa 
during the Great Depression (Letters 8). 
Vonnegut’s biographer, Charles J. Shields, best explains the impact that this trip 
had on Vonnegut’s writing. Shields suggests that although the destinations of the trip 
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were disappointments, the trip still gave Vonnegut a fresh way to approach his book. 
Shields attributes this to the books that Vonnegut took with him on the trip, The Waking 
by Theodore Roethke and Céline and His Vision by Erika Ostrovsky. In the context of the 
trip these two works led Vonnegut “to several realizations about the effect of time on 
making sense of experience” (Shields 230). The following lines from a Roethke poem 
affected him deeply: 
I wake to sleep, and take my sleeping slow. 
I feel my fate in what I cannot fear. 
I learn by going where I have to go. 
 
We think by feeling. What is there to know? (qtd. Shields 230) 
After seeing that the Dresden that existed was so far removed from the Dresden he 
experienced, Vonnegut was freed from the constraints of what was truly there. He said 
later on about writing Slaughterhouse Five, “I need not show the bombing of Dresden” 
(qtd. in Shields 231). Instead Vonnegut would show the experience: what he felt rather 
than what he knew.  
By whipping Billy Pilgrim back and forth through time and showing him 
struggling to get his bearings in his chaotic life, Vonnegut told his audience more about 
the experience of being in the war than just the cold and lifeless facts of how many 
people died and how many bombs were dropped. Shields explains: “For Vonnegut to 
describe his feelings of shock and confusion as a young army private – feelings that later 
took shape as nightmares – the truth was useless…. What he needed to communicate was 
the delirium created by his sense of chaos. And he could do it by playing havoc with 
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time…” (Shields 232). Playing havoc with time was a characteristic that he adopted from 
Céline’s writings after being reminded of his work in Erika Ostrovsky’s book. Vonnegut 
particularly admired the way Céline used language to make the reader feel a certain way: 
“Céline spat words on the page, hurled images at the reader giving the sensation of events 
happening frantically, out of context” (Shields 231). Likewise, Vonnegut pulls his readers 
away from the comfort of conventional novels and context and brings them along on the 
chaotic trip back and forth through time with Billy: “Billy is spastic in time, has no 
control over where he is going next, and the trips aren’t necessarily fun. He is in a 
constant state of stage fright, he says, because he never knows what part of his life he is 
going to have to act in next” (SH 23). The trip to Europe gave Vonnegut the style he 
would use to show the journey of Billy Pilgrim. 
Vonnegut tried for decades to get his stories published in magazines. Time after 
time he was rejected. The problem was that “Americans were living in a Cold War “age 
of anxiety,” and he wanted to address contemporary issues…” (Shields 121). Erin Mercer 
addresses this problem of post-War literature in Repression and Realism in Post-War 
American Literature (2011). Mercer argues that Americans suppressed the horrors of 
WWII: the Holocaust, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the 
destruction of modern warfare. This repression is evidenced by the literature that was 
produced in this era, none of which addressed these horrors. Mercer suggests: “If the only 
evidence was the fiction produced in America during the first decade following 1945, one 
would get the impression that the horrors of World War II had never even happened” 
(Mercer 1-2). 
McArdle 37 
In 1961 Vonnegut wrote a letter to the founder of MAD magazine pitching an idea 
for a short story about fallout shelters. In Vonnegut’s story people could take one of two 
courses of action to protect themselves from atomic bombs: they could build shelters or 
they could buy kits that would help them take over other people’s shelters (Letters 86). 
His edgy ideas were often read by editors but never actually picked up; they would just 
be returned with comments. This falls within the pattern of repression that Mercer 
suggests: ideas like Vonnegut’s fall-out-shelter story would force Americans to 
acknowledge unpleasant ideas that they were not ready to address. 
Struggling to make money for his growing family, Vonnegut wrote a frustrated, 
sarcastic letter to Burger complaining about magazine editors who neglected to see the 
value in his work: “Don’t touch any of the atom-bombed buildings, Angel – you’ll get 
your lily-white hands dirty on the charcoal” and “Why, who’s that scrambling over the 
rubble toward us but Jacob Malik, wearing a zoot-suit, chewing gum, playing with a yo-
yo, and rooting for the Dodgers. Have some of mom’s apple pie, Jake” (Letters 43). 
Yakov Alexandrovich Malik was a Soviet diplomat at the time and Vonnegut’s 
comments show his frustration with Americans’ inability to address the real issues that 
faced the country; rather Americans would choose to see an Americanized version of an 
adversary such as Malik. The Cold War was picking up and the arms race was advancing 
to dangerous levels, but Americans just wanted to buy their new televisions and cars. As 
Mercer points out, much of the post-war literature actually focused on the banality of 
suburban life instead of dealing with the wounds of WWII. Vonnegut wanted to address 
the elephant in the room, but mainstream magazine editors were not ready to look.  
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After World War II, Americans were not ready for Vonnegut’s stories about 
doom and man-made death. However, as the war in Vietnam dragged on, more people 
began to openly protest the war and cry out against the atrocities being committed. 1969, 
the year Slaughterhouse Five was published, was the height of U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam. In 1968, news of the Tet Offensive shocked the nation as it showed how poorly 
the US was faring in Vietnam while politicians continued to lie that America and the 
South Vietnamese were winning. Revelations about the My Lai Massacre and the 
saturation bombings of Laos and Cambodia in 1969 added to American outrage over the 
Vietnam War. The environment of protest that surrounded Vietnam was the best 
environment for Vonnegut’s anti-war book to get traction and take off. The country was 
finally ready to hear his story.  
The final important experience that shaped Slaughterhouse Five was the 
connections Vonnegut drew between his own experiences in war and his son’s request to 
be classified as a conscientious objector to the Vietnam War. On November 28, 1967, 
Vonnegut wrote a letter to Draft Board #1 in Hyannis, Massachusetts. He staunchly 
supported his son’s decision to refuse to fight in Vietnam: “It is in keeping with the way I 
have raised him. All his life he has learned hatred for killing from me” (Letters 140). 
Mary O’Hare reminded Vonnegut that wars are cyclical in nature: a war is fought and the 
men who fought in that war tell stories about all the brave parts and the children who hear 
those stories grow up to create their own wars to live their own heroic moments. 
Vonnegut includes this theme in Slaughterhouse Five; he shows how wars are passed 
down from father to son. Slaughterhouse Five works to break this cycle and so does 
Vonnegut’s letter to the draft board. He explains to the draft board that his father gave 
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him guns when he passed away, “but they are covered with rust” (Letters 140). He tells 
the board that he is a WWII veteran: “I was an infantry scout, saw plenty of action, was 
finally captured and served about six months as a prisoner of war in Germany. I have a 
Purple Heart. I was honorably discharged. I am entitled, it seems to me, to pass on to my 
son my opinion of killing” (Letters 140). Vonnegut took part in the cycle – he inherited 
his father’s guns, he took part in WWII – but he will not pass the love of war onto his 
sons. 
The sentiments stated in the letter to the draft board arise throughout 
Slaughterhouse Five. In the first chapter, the narrator explains what he taught his sons 
about war: “I have told my sons that they are not under any circumstances to take part in 
massacres, and that the news of the massacres of enemies is not to fill them with 
satisfaction or glee. I have also told them not to work for companies which make 
massacre machinery…” (SH 19). To end the novel Vonnegut returns to the cycle: “My 
father died many years ago now – of natural causes. So it goes. He was a sweet man. He 
was a gun nut, too. He left me his guns. They rust” (SH 210). The narrator allows the 
guns to rust because he will not perpetuate the idea of glamorous wars. He refuses to send 
his sons to war after his experiences in Germany. 
For two decades the idea of writing about Dresden weighed on Vonnegut’s mind. 
He thought it was his duty to share his experiences, but every outline he wrote was 
promptly discarded. Mary O’Hare helped him realize that his book would protest war; he 
did not want to be the kind of author that perpetuated glamorous stereotypes. The 
Hollywood agent reinforced this theme by challenging Vonnegut to create a hero. Once 
Vonnegut realized that a hero had no place in his story, he was able to focus on his sad, 
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anti-hero Billy. The trip to Europe helped Vonnegut develop the frantic style of writing 
that gives the audience an idea of the kind of chaos that surrounds war. Finally, writing a 
letter in support of his son’s objection to the Vietnam War allowed Vonnegut to connect 
the two wars that, although separate in time, still followed the same themes of death and 
destruction.  
 
Themes of Slaughterhouse Five 
In an era of policymakers afflicted by the Munich Syndrome, what kind of book 
did Vonnegut produce? And, how did that book speak to so many people, quickly rising 
to the New York Times bestseller list where it remained for sixteen weeks? In the previous 
section I discussed how writing Slaughterhouse Five affected Vonnegut, but as Vees-
Gulani points out, publishing the novel forced it into the public arena: “the stories of 
Billy, the narrator, and consequently Vonnegut take on a public dimension. They draw 
attention to something that we often prefer to suppress and deny although it is important 
to remember, namely the crippling nature of war and the terrible toll that modern warfare 
extracts from those forced to live through it” (182). Perhaps Slaughterhouse Five was so 
popular because it was giving Americans something they desperately craved: the truth. 
Mercer’s post-WWII literature review reveals that Americans sought to deal with the 
atrocities of the war by ignoring them. Slaughterhouse Five gave readers something that 
no other WWII books had: a real look at what soldiers endured during the war. The 
timing was ripe for Vonnegut; the height of the Vietnam War was sparking protests 
throughout the nation. Leaders and policymakers pointed to WWII as justification for 
intervening and staying in Vietnam, but Slaughterhouse Five dispelled the myth of the 
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noble war by revealing the truth, thus giving Vietnam protestors more ammunition to 
fight against the war in Southeast Asia.  
The truths that Vonnegut revealed correspond with the major themes of the novel. 
The first is that the reality of war is vastly different than the perception of war back 
home. Secondly, policymakers and the American people refused to acknowledge the 
effects of war on veterans, namely, PTSD. And finally, war begets war and the cycle 
must be broken.  
One of the ways that political and military leaders can hide the real consequences 
of war is by severing the connection between reality and perception back home. 
Vonnegut shows what war was really like. One startling realization that Vonnegut brings 
to light is that wars are fought by regular men, not G.I. Joe. Billy is obviously Vonnegut’s 
clearest example of this issue. Billy is described as “preposterous – six feet and three 
inches tall, with a chest and shoulders like a box of kitchen matches” and most 
importantly, “he didn’t look like a soldier at all. He looked liked a filthy flamingo” (SH 
82-83). Here Vonnegut is asking his audience to think about what a “soldier” looks like. 
Most people probably picture a tall, broad man with five o’clock shadow across a strong 
jaw line. In reality, not all soldiers are like that. Some are like Billy, “powerless to harm 
the enemy or to help his friends” (SH 30). As I explained in the previous section, Billy 
Pilgrim is an anti-hero. Vonnegut felt like there was no place for a hero in his story about 
WWII. By not including a hero, Vonnegut removed some of the glamor that surrounds 
war. 
Billy is not the only example of what real soldiers were like. The character of 
Billy is modeled after a man that Vonnegut knew in the war: Edward Crone seemed 
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completely unequipped for war and unwilling to accept the reality of his situation. 
However, the many other examples of soldiers show that Crone was not the exception. 
Upon arrival at the prison camp all of the American prisoners were made to strip. A 
German guard looked at Billy and  “asked a companion what sort of an army would send 
a weakling like that to the front. They looked at the other American bodies now, pointed 
out a lot more that were nearly as bad as Billy’s” (SH 83). In an exchange with a Dresden 
woman, three American soldiers admit that they are not equipped to handle war: one says 
he is too young, a second says he is too old, and Billy Pilgrim says he is not sure what he 
is. In response to the Americans, “‘All the real soldiers are dead,’ she said. It was true. So 
it goes” (SH 159).  
The only “real” soldiers who fit the glamorized image are the Englishmen that are 
also held as prisoners of war in Germany. The English soldiers were some of the first 
English-speaking prisoners to be captured in the war, so they were part of the group of 
mature men who volunteered to fight. In contrast to these men stood the young boys and 
old men who had to be sent into the war when the first group was not enough. These 
English soldiers were well-fed because of a mistake in a Red Cross order for supplies that 
gave them five hundred parcels of food instead of fifty. They lifted weights, maintained 
their hygiene, and sang together. The Englishmen “made war look stylish and reasonable, 
and fun” (SH 94). However, they only portrayed that appearance because they were not 
actually part of the war. They were prisoners for four years and well taken care of. The 
Englishmen had forgotten what the war was really like. After the Americans had time to 
clean themselves and shave, the English colonel said to the oldest American prisoner, 
“You know – we’ve had to imagine the war here, and we have imagined that it was being 
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fought by aging men like ourselves. We had forgotten that wars were fought by babies. 
When I saw those freshly shaved faces, it was a shock. ‘My God, my God –’ I said to 
myself, ‘It’s the Children’s Crusade’” (SH 106). 
Even on the opposing side, the soldiers were ill prepared, creating a connection 
between people and defying the boundaries of nations. Of the five soldiers who capture 
Billy, two are in their early teens and “two were ramshackle old men – droolers as 
toothless as carp. They were irregulars, armed and clothed fragmentarily with junk taken 
from real soldiers who were newly dead” (SH 52). Even the German’s commander, who 
resembled more closely the image of the hardened soldier, is done with the war: “he was 
a very good soldier – about to quit, about to find somebody to surrender to” (SH 53). The 
“real” soldiers, who are not dead yet, are sick of war. Even the “real” soldiers just want it 
to end. 
Refusing to acknowledge the atrocities of the war meant that Americans and 
American leaders refused to acknowledge the damaging effects that the war experiences 
had on veterans. In the previous section, I explained how Vees-Gulani diagnosed 
Vonnegut with PTSD by diagnosing Billy Pilgrim. Billy shows many of the classic signs 
of PTSD: he relives his experiences, he is in a constant state of hyperarousal, he weeps 
uncontrollably, he cannot sleep, and he never talks about what he saw. By depicting 
Billy’s affliction, Vonnegut tells his audience the story of a broken veteran struggling to 
come to terms with what he lived through.  
Billy is constantly reminded of the war in everything he does. Patterns of colors 
resurface throughout the novel, which connect Billy to the war. When Billy is first 
captured and taken to Germany, he is marched into a prison camp and past piles of 
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corpses “with bare feet that were blue and ivory” (SH 65). The train in which the 
prisoners of war were transported was marked with orange and black stripes to indicate 
that it was not a fair target for airplanes. Once Billy is home safe, he still sees these 
colors. The night of his daughter’s wedding he looks out at the tent where the wedding 
had taken place: “a gaily striped tent in Billy’s backyard. The stripes were orange and 
black” (SH 72). He cannot sleep so he sneaks out of bed: “He looked down at his bare 
feet. They were ivory and blue” (SH 72). Sitting safely behind his desk in Ilium, New 
York, Billy is startled every day by the same siren that announces high noon: “He was 
expecting World War Three at any time” (SH 57).  
Billy lives in two presents, often re-experiencing moments from the war. The 
narrator tells the audience that Billy is “unstuck in time” and moves unwillingly 
throughout the moments of his life. He is behind enemy lines in Germany with broken 
civilian shoes, no helmet, no coat, and no weapon when he first comes unstuck in time. 
He is tired from days of travelling through the snow and avoiding German soldiers who 
were searching through the woods to find any survivors: “This was when Billy first came 
unstuck in time. His attention began to swing grandly through the full arc of his life, 
passing into death, which was violet light” (SH 43). This time travel is an escape 
mechanism while Billy is in the war. Soon after the Germans capture Billy, he time 
travels again to his office in Ilium. The causal effects of the time travelling are different 
in these two cases. The first time Billy comes unstuck in time it is to escape his present of 
dying in the woods and he is shaken out of it by another soldier. The second time, Billy’s 
true present is being in his office and he is reliving his capture in the war, which is clear 
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because his patient is waking him up from his time travelling. The second time is a 
flashback, common in people afflicted with PTSD.  
According to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, one of the four major 
symptoms of PTSD is “negative changes in beliefs and feelings.” This characteristic 
holds true for Billy as he adopts the Traflamadorian view of life. Billy writes in a letter to 
the Ilium News Leader: “The most important thing I learned on Tralfamadore was that 
when a person dies he only appears to die. He is still very much alive in the past, so it is 
very silly for people to cry at his funeral” (SH 26-27). In this letter the origin of the 
famously repeated line is revealed: “Now when I myself hear that somebody is dead, I 
simply shrug and say what the Tralfamadorians say about dead people, which is ‘So it 
goes’” (SH 27). For a man who witnessed so much death, it is much easier for Billy to 
believe that people are still alive in other moments of their lives and that death is just a 
temporary state. The dismissal of death in the phrase “so it goes” shows Billy’s apathy, a 
common symptom of PTSD. He shows apathy towards death and towards all negative 
events in life. He says that the Tralfamadorians told him in regards to their wars, “There 
isn’t anything we can do about them, so we simply don’t look at them. We ignore them” 
(SH 117). Similarly, Billy avoids talking about his experiences in the war with anyone, 
including his wife.  
The climax of Billy’s affliction comes during the celebration for his eighteenth 
wedding anniversary. At the party, a barbershop quartet sings and Billy’s “mouthed filled 
with the taste of lemonade, and his face became grotesque, as though he really were 
being stretched on the torture engine called the rack” (SH 173). Unlike when Billy 
experiences flashbacks, he cannot figure out the connection between this barbershop 
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quartet and his physical revulsion: “Here was proof that he had a great big secret 
somewhere inside, and he could not imagine what it was” (SH 173). This scene shows the 
depth of Billy’s repression: even he cannot figure out why he had such a strong reaction. 
This experience is different than any other flashback Billy has in the book. He usually 
maintains a normal appearance, but this experience was enough to break his regular 
façade. It happens again when the quartet starts up another song and Billy leaves the 
party to think about what happened: “Billy thought hard about the effect the quartet had 
had on him, and then found an association with an experience he had had long ago. He 
did not travel in time to the experience. He remembered it shimmeringly” (SH 177).
 The experience that Billy recounts is the closest that Billy’s memory and the 
novel ever get to the bombing of Dresden. He remembers being in the meat locker of the 
slaughterhouse while Dresden was being destroyed above. After it was safe to resurface, 
the prisoners and their four guards saw that the beautiful city looked more like the surface 
of the moon and that everybody in that beautiful city was meant to be dead. The four 
German guards “drew together instinctively, rolled their eyes. They experimented with 
one expression and then another, said nothing, though their mouths were often open. 
They looked like a silent film of a barbershop quartet” (SH 178). For Billy Pilgrim and 
for Kurt Vonnegut, the memory of the firebombing of Dresden is too traumatic to face 
head on. Instead, this memory is the only glimmer of the bombing that the reader ever 
gets. The hole in the story is obvious. In regards to the omission Vonnegut said, “there 
was a complete forgetting of what it was like… the center had been pulled right out of the 
story” (qtd. in Cacicedo 360). 
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Vees-Gulani explains that PTSD is not only caused by the traumatic events 
themselves but also by an atmosphere in society that hinders the processing of coping 
with the stressful situations. Mercer’s description of post-war literature clearly shows the 
kind of atmosphere that veterans were returning home to: a society in denial. When the 
narrator describes the processes of writing the novel, he tells the reader that he reached 
out to the Air Force asking for details about the bombing of Dresden. He was told that he 
could not have access to that information because it was still top secret; “Secret? My God 
– from whom?” (SH 11). A whole city was leveled, along with most of its inhabitants, 
and the U.S. Air Force wanted to call it a secret.  
Even in the veterans’ hospital, doctors search for any cause of ailments other than 
the war. Billy voluntarily goes to the hospital because he believes he is going crazy: he is 
struggling to cope with his surroundings and to reconcile his current life with his 
traumatic experiences from the war. However, the doctors “didn’t think it had anything to 
do with the war. They were sure Billy was going to pieces because his father had thrown 
him into the deep end of the Y.M.C.A. swimming pool when he was a little boy, and had 
then taken him to the rim of the Grand Canyon” (SH 100). Billy and his roommate in the 
hospital, Eliot Rosewater, lament their loss of interest in living. They both find that the 
regular way of coping with issues is not enough for the horrors they witnessed. 
Rosewater tells a psychiatrist at the hospital, “I think you guys are going to have to come 
up with a lot of wonderful new lies, or people just aren’t going to want to go on living” 
(SH 101).  
The old lies that Rosewater finds inadequate are the Judeo-Christian teachings. 
The old religious lessons do not explain the things that the veterans saw so they need 
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something new. They look to science fiction because “they were trying to re-invent 
themselves and their universe” (SH 101). In keeping with the theme of religion as a 
method of coping, Billy becomes something of a prophet for the Tralfamadorian way of 
thinking. In a lecture to his followers one day, Billy tells them he will soon die and 
reminds them not to be sad because death is only one moment in a whole lifetime of 
moments; it is reminiscent of Christ’s last supper with the apostles. Cacicedo believes 
that “Billy must be seen as a spiritual pilgrim who follows in the footsteps of Christ” 
(365). I believe that Billy diverges from the teachings of Christ and is a spiritual pilgrim 
in search of a new mythology to help him cope. Rather than focusing on an afterlife, Billy 
chooses to believe that life on earth never really ends and that people can choose to only 
look at the pleasant moments and ignore the bad ones. 
Later on, a plane on which Billy is a passenger crashes in Vermont and he ends up 
in another hospital. He shares a room with Bertram Copeland Rumfoord, a Harvard 
history professor. Rumfoord represents the proponents of war with power and wealth 
who refuse to acknowledge the human cost. While in the hospital, Rumfoord is working 
on a book about the Army Air Corps in WWII. Billy, a witness to the bombing of 
Dresden, a topic that Rumfoord is including in his book, is sitting one bed over and 
Rumfoord expresses nothing but disinterest and disgust towards Billy. Sure that Billy 
could no longer hear or think, Rumfoord says to his wife, “Why don’t they let him die? 
… That’s not a human being anymore… Look at him! That’s life according to the 
medical profession. Isn’t life wonderful?” (SH 190). The irony is that the war that 
Rumfoord exalts is what made Billy the way he is. Even when Billy attempts to talk to 
Rumfoord about Dresden, Rumfoord dismisses him as just having echolalia: “Rumfoord 
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was thinking in a military manner: that an inconvenient person, one whose death he 
wished for very much, for practical reasons, was suffering from a repulsive disease” (SH 
192). 
The theme of ordinary soldiers as inconsequential to the policymakers reaches its 
climax with the exchange between Rumfoord and Billy. The sick veteran struggles to be 
heard: “there in the hospital, Billy was having an adventure very common among people 
without power in time of war: He was trying to prove to a willfully deaf and blind enemy 
that he was interesting to hear and see” (SH 193). The narrator even explains that there 
are almost no dramatic characters in this story or dramatic confrontations “because most 
of the people in it are so sick and so much the listless playthings of enormous forces” (SH 
164). Rumfoord causes Billy and the reader much frustration; if he would only listen to 
those like Billy, the “sick” and “listless” from the war, then he would have a better 
understanding of the Dresden air raid. 
The final and perhaps most significant theme that Vonnegut created to reveal the 
truth about WWII is that war begets more war. In dismantling the myth of a glamorous or 
noble war Vonnegut seeks to prevent future wars from being justified. There are many 
images of violence being passed down from father to son throughout Slaughterhouse 
Five. Roland Weary tells Billy that his father had a large collection of guns, swords, and 
torture instruments. Throughout their time together Weary seems obsessed with torture 
and violence: he tells Billy “about neat tortures he’d read about or seen in the movies or 
heard on the radio – about other neat tortures he himself had invented” (SH 36). 
Vonnegut is revealing that love of violence is taught and enforced through popular media 
as well as passed down generationally. This is similar to the message conveyed through 
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Mary O’Hare when she expressed concern that Vonnegut’s novel would make war seem 
glamorous and so everyone would want to have another and her children would have to 
fight.  
Even Billy’s religious upbringing points him in the direction of violence. As a 
child he “had an extremely gruesome crucifix hanging on the wall of his little bedroom in 
Ilium. A military surgeon would have admired the clinical fidelity of the artist’s rendition 
of all Christ’s wounds – the spear wound, the thorn wounds, the holes that were made by 
the iron spikes. Billy’s Christ died horribly” (SH 38). Not a biological father but rather 
the spiritual Father is passing on violence to his children. Perhaps this is why Billy and 
Elliot Rosewater feel that the Judeo-Christian teachings are not enough to compel them to 
live: they already saw too much violence.  
The enormity and power of the cycle of violence is clearly conveyed in 
Slaughterhouse Five. When the narrator tells someone that he is writing an anti-war 
book, the man replies, “Why don’t you write an anti-glacier book instead?” (SH 3). Even 
the narrator admits, “What he meant, of course, was that there would always be wars, that 
they were as easy to stop as glaciers. I believe that, too” (SH  3). When the 
Tralfamadorians talk to Billy about their wars, they resign themselves to the belief that 
the wars cannot be stopped so it is better to just ignore those times altogether. The 
Tralfamadorians cannot do anything to stop their wars because they have no free will, 
and they inform Billy that free will is only an illusion of Earthlings. Instead, the 
Tralfamadorians say, and Billy comes to believe, “All time is all time. It does not change. 
It does not lend itself to warnings or explanations. It simply is. Take it moment by 
moment, and you will find that we are all… bugs in amber” (SH 86).  
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Although the cycle seems unstoppable, Vonnegut is not discouraged. If Vonnegut 
truly believed that writing an anti-war book was equivalent to writing an anti-glacier 
book, he would not have written Slaughterhouse Five. Instead of accepting wars as a 
given in human existence, he takes steps to end the cycle. In the first chapter, the narrator, 
the fictionalized Vonnegut, tells the reader that he taught his sons that they are not to take 
part in any massacres, to work for companies to make massacre machinery, or to take joy 
from the massacre of enemies. He supports his son’s refusal to serve in Vietnam. He does 
not pass violence on to his sons and he refuses to accept violence from his father: he lets 
the guns he inherited rust.  
Even in describing the Tralfamadorian view of the world Vonnegut shows disgust 
for so much passivity. A Tralfamadorian casually explains to Billy that it is their fault the 
universe will end when a Tralfamadorian pilot experimenting with fuels presses a button 
and the whole universe disappears and they have no intention of stopping it: “He has 
always pressed it, and he always will. We always let him and we always will let him. The 
moment is structured that way” (SH 117). Even Billy initially responds to this with a 
confused, “Um.” Vonnegut does not want the reader to accept war or violence as 
passively as the Tralfamadorians. To close the novel Vonnegut includes imagery that 
leads the reader out of a painful tale of a veteran’s struggle up to the light. When the 
prisoners of Dresden are released and the war is over, it is springtime and “the trees were 
leafing out” and “Birds were talking” (SH 215).  
Slaughterhouse Five broke two decades of silence surrounding WWII. Vonnegut 
created strong themes that worked against the assumptions that led policymakers into 
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Vietnam, namely, that WWII was undeniably noble and nothing bad came of it because 
the United States was fighting pure evil.  
 
Conclusion 
With Slaughterhouse Five Vonnegut sought to warn his audience to always 
question assumptions. Following WWII, American leaders were terrified of another 
global battle. They pointed to the one event that they believed led directly to WWII and 
said never again. Never again would they repeat the mistakes of the Munich Conference. 
Never again would they give an aggressor even an inch because no doubt they would 
steal a mile. These determinations greatly informed foreign policy decisions following 
the war. Aggression in Iran, Greece, and Turkey was met with staunch American 
opposition. Aggression in Korea led to an American war. And finally, aggression in 
Vietnam wrangled the US into a long-term involvement of questionable intent and 
ultimate defeat.  
The Munich analogy was taken for granted by the American people and American 
leaders. Therefore the analogy could be cited to scare citizens into supporting an 
extensive and invasive foreign policy and WWII could be pointed at to justify the 
rightness of any intervention.  
Even contemporary artists were silent, choosing to focus on the boredom of 
suburban life in the 1950s rather than the fresh wounds of the war. The veterans of WWII 
returned home to this culture of repression with no way to work through their trauma. 
One brave veteran, with the writing skills to record his experiences, set about telling his 
story with the dual purpose of walking his own path to healing and exposing the nation to 
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the truth about WWII. Vonnegut spent twenty-four years finding the right way to tell his 
story. It came out jumbled, frantic, and surreal, but that was the story of war.  
Literature can be a powerful force for challenging the status quo. Writers like 
Vonnegut can provide a different perspective on contemporary issues and project that 
perspective to a wide audience. Vonnegut provided the perspective of a soldier and a 
prisoner of war, rather than the perspectives of the military and political leaders that 
stood in the forefront of people’s minds when they thought of WWII. Slaughterhouse 
Five gave Americans a truth that they desperately needed as death tolls in Vietnam were 
skyrocketing upward. By throwing light on a questionable comparison, the Munich 
analogy, Vonnegut may have cured its adherents of the syndrome and hastened the end of 
a questionable war.  
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